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NOTES AND COMMENT
REVOCATION OF INTERVIVOS TRUSTS IN NEW YORK

Changing economic, social and family relationships have given
rise to increased efforts to revoke intervivos trusts which were created under conditions which at the time were deemed propitious.
The revocation of such a trust cannot safely be effected by the
voluntary acts of the donor and the trustee since vested or contingent
rights of individuals, including possible unborn persons, are almost
invariably involved which are not subject to summary dispositions
by the parties to the trust instrument. Judicial determination is,
accordingly, imperative.
In New York State the revocation of an intervivos trust is governed by Section 23 of the Personal Property Law and Section 118
of the Real Property Law-the written consent of all parties "beneficially interested" must be obtained.' This entails difficulty in many
instances, because minors and those under legal disability cannot give
valid consents.
The primary determination to be made at all times is whether
a reversion in the donor or a remainder interest in others has been
created. The line between the two is often shadowy and difficult of
ascertainment. What did the donor of the trust intend to accomplish when he created it? The answer to this vital question must be
found in the language of the trust instrument and the attendant
circumstances.2 Once it is determined that a reversion or a remainder is involved, then the next problem, an equally difficult and
perplexing one, is to ascertain who are "beneficially interested" in

1 N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 23. "Revocation of Trusts Upon Consent of
All Persons Interested. Upon the written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal property or any part thereof heretofore
or hereafter created, the creator of such trust may revoke the same as to the
whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease
in the whole or such part thereof." N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 118. "Revocation of Trusts Upon Consent of All Persons Interested. Upon the written
consent acknowledged or proved in the manner required to entitle conveyances
of real property to be recorded of all the persons beneficially interested in a
trust in real property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the
creator of such trust may revoke the whole or such part thereof by an instrument in writing acknowledged or proved in like manner and thereupon the
estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof. If the
conveyance or other instrument creating a trust in real property shall have
been recorded in the office of the clerk (or register) of any county of this
state, the instrument or instruments revoking such trust with the consents
thereto as above provided shall be recorded in the same office of every county
in which the conveyance or other instrument creating such trust shall have
been recorded."
2 Richardson v. Richardson, 120 N. Y. L. J. 411 (Ct. of App. Sept. 13,
1948); Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 295 N. Y. 488,
68 N. E. 2d 503 (1946); Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 280
N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673 (1939); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller,
278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. 2d 553 (1938) ; Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of
New York, 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
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the trust, and correlatively whether all the valid consents required
by the statute have been obtained. Where the settlor has retained
a reversion of the corpus, ordinarily only those who have or may
have an interest in the income from the trust during its term must
consent. Where, however, the settlor has created remainder interests in the corpus, those who have or may have some interest in the
disposition of the corpus, may burgeon out into the vast reaches of
the upper branches of family trees, to persons who may be presently
unascertainable. Obstacles may then arise which make revocation
impossible.
Ordinarily, a grant over to the donor's heirs-at-law or next-ofkin does not create in them remainder interests which require valid
consents to extinguish. They acquire no rights "as purchasers" under
the instrument and a reversion in the grantor usually results. However, this rule is only "a prima facie precept of construction"
that must yield to the intention of the grantor as found by the
courts from the
language employed, together with the pertinent
3
circumstances.
When the language is clear and explicit and reflects an obvious
intent, no interpretation is indulged in. Definite rules or principles
of law are then applicable.
In Doctor v. Hughes,4 the settlor created a trust, the income of
which was to be used to pay his debts and an annuity to himself.
Upon his death the trustee was directed to convey the property to
the heirs-at-law of the settlor. The court held that a reversion had
been reserved.

".

.

. to transform into a remainder what should

ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation
must be clearly expressed.... No one is heir to the living and seldom
do the living mean to forego the power of disposition during life by
the direction that upon death there shall be a transfer to their heirs." ,
When, therefore, the trustees are directed simply to transfer
the property to the next-of-kin of the settlor upon the expiration of
the trust term, no remainder in such next-of-kin may be found.
When somewhat different language was employed a contrary re6
sult followed. In Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York,
the income of the trust was given to two beneficiaries. Upon the
death of the survivor the trustees were directed to convey the corpus
to the settlor, if alive, if not, then to his appointees by will, or, in
default thereof, to those who would take by intestacy had the settlor
3 Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 250 N. Y. 298, 165
N. E. 454 (1929) ; Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
4 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919). See Warren, A Remainder to the
Grantor's Heirs, 22 TEX. L. Rxv. 22 (1943) for an interesting article by Prof.
Warren on the applicability of the doctrine of "worthier title" to cases involving a gift over to the grantor's heirs.
5 Id. at 312, 313, 122 N. E. at 222, 223.
6250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929). For the sake of clarity Crane, J.,
referred to the three settlors in the singular.
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then died the owner of the property. The court held that a remainder
had been created in those persons who were the presumptive nextof-kin of the settlor.

".

.

. The settlor .

.

. makes rather full and

formal disposition of the principal of the trust estate in case he died
before the life beneficiary ....

The creator of the trust reserves power

of disposition only by will; he does something more than merely set
up a-trust for a life beneficiary; he disposes of the property at the
termination of the life interests in case of his previous death .... "'T
Emphasis is here placed upon two factors-(1) no power to
transfer by deed or assignment was reserved by the settlors, and
(2) the interest of the next-of-kin was subject to divestment only by
the last will and testament of the settlors.8
Inextricably bound up with the primary problem is that of determining who are "beneficially interested" in the trust when a remainder is created, from whom valid written consents are necessary
to effect revocation. An abortive attempt was made in Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., Thatcher v. Empire Trust Co. and
Corbett v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.,9 to limit such persons
to those who would be entitled to take if the settlor were to die at
the time revocation was attempted. This reasoning was predicated
upon the absence of language in the Whittemore case as t6 whether
any consents other than those of presumptive next-of-kin (the minor
children) of the settlor would have been necessary. It was felt that
there was an implication in that case that if the children then living
had not been minors and had consented, then all other possible contingent remaindermen would have been cut off. 10
Many of the elements in the Whittemore case were present in
Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 1 yet a different result
was reached. The settlor had made a full and formal disposition of
the property. He retained no right to dispose of the corpus by deed
or assignment, but did reserve some control over the investments to
be made by the trustee. Additionally, the income, while payable to
him for life, was limited to a twenty-year period. If he died within
at 303, 165 N. E. at 456.

7Id.
8 It should

be noted that the court completely disregarded the possibility
of reverter should the settlor survive the life beneficiaries.
9 Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 288
N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936); Thatcher v. Empire Trust Co., 243 App.
Div. 430, 277 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1st Dep't 1935); Corbett v. Bank of New
York & Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930);
accord, Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 396, aff'd, 261 N. Y. 533, 185 N. E. 726 (1932). These cases were later
superseded by Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 280 N. Y. 43, 19
N. E. 2d 673 (1939); Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co 267 N. Y. 358, 196
N. E. 288 (1935); Hopkins v. Bank oi New York, 261 App. Div. 465, 25
N. Y. S. 2d 888 (lst Dep't 1941).
20 See note 9 supra.

21235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (lst Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260
N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).
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the twenty years the corpus was to be distributed according to the
laws of intestacy, upon failure to exercise a reserved testamentary
power of appointment. If the settlor was alive at the end of said
period then the corpus was to revert to him. Here the court found
that a reversion had been created and significantly noted that
"....

the only contingency upon which some one other than plaintiff

could acquire an interest would be his death prior to the expiration
of the 20-year period." 12 The decision appears to have been predicated upon the existence of two factors-that the settlor was the
beneficiary for what amounted to a flat term of years and that he retained control to some degree over the investments to be made by
the trustee.
The latter factor was controlling in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Armstrong.'3 The court held that where there is reserved the power to
supervise or control the investments made by the trustee there is also
reserved a reversion of the corpus upon the termination of all the
life interests. It should be noted, however, that here the joint settlors
had expressly reserved the power to revoke by joint action during
their joint lives and that revocation was allowed only to the extent
of the share
contributed by the surviving settlor who was seeking
14
revocation.
The first factor, a flat term of years, came before the court in
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller,15 although the problem of
revocation was not directly involved. The question was whether the
property bound up in the trust constituted part of the decedent's estate and the answer to that question depended upon whether the trust
instrument created a reversion or remainder.
The settlor had provided that the income and the principal of
the trust were to be paid to her until the balance was reduced to
$5,000 at which time it was to be paid over to her. If the settlor
died prior to that time the principal was to be paid to her appointees
by will or in default thereof, to those entitled to it by the intestacy
laws of New York. It was held that a reversion had been retained,
and that the property passed as a part of her estate. Since the payments were to be made in fixed installments it was only a simple
mathematical calculation to determine just when the balance would
be returned to the settlor and the trust term, therefore, was actually
for a flat term of years. 16

Id. at 173, 256 N. Y. Supp. at 566.
Misc. -, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 268 App. Div.
763, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 286 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N. Y. 666, 60 N. E. 2d
757 (1945).
14 See Culver v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 296 N. Y. 74, 70 N. E. 2d
163 (1946).
15278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. 2d 553 (1938).
'16 See Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256
N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1932).
12

'13-
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When the rights stem from the trust instrument itself and are
clearly defined by the writing which indicates a purpose to make a
gift of a remainder to those out of the ordinary line of succession,
then effect will be given to the settlor's intent despite the rule that
ordinarily a reservation to the heirs of a grantor results in a reversion.
In Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 17 the settlor completely divested himself of any interest in the income from the trust as well
as any reversionary interest, except that which might be found from
the limitation over of the principal to the heirs of the settlor should
the life beneficiary who was given the right to designate a person to
receive the principal, fail to do so. The heirs of the settlor were defined by the instrument to be those who would be entitled to share in
the distribution of the personal estate of the settlor "under the laws
of the State of New York at the time of such distribution." 18 The
court held that, "Any person who under the terms of the instrument
has a right, whether present or future, whether vested or contingent,
to income or principal of the trust fund, has a beneficial interest in
the trust ....

Any right given by the trust instrument to receive a

benefit from the trust in some contingency is a 'beneficial interest'
in the trust.
"Such a right is given by the trust instrument to the settlor's
'heirs' as defined by that instrument.... the trust instrument makes
no provision for distribution among a class composed of those who
would be entitled to share in the distribution of the personal estate
of the settlor if he were to die today. The distribution must be made
among the class of those who would be entitled to share in the personal estate of the settlor at the time of distribution of the income or
corpus of the trust fund." 19 In short the ordinary line of succession
had been varied.
It was therefore considered immaterial that all those had consented who would be the "heirs" defined in the instrument were the
settlor to die today. "A person can consent to the destruction of a
beneficial interest in trust which is or may hereafter become vested
in him, and thus deprive his heirs or descendants of an expected
benefit; yet no person can by his consent destroy an interest, even
of his own descendants, derived directly from the trust instrument
and not derived from the ancestor by succession." 20
Whether unborn members of the class designated by the instrument who would have upon birth, a contingent interest in the principal were also persons
"beneficially interested" in the trust was ex21
pressly left open.

17267
18

N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 288 (1935).
362, 196 N. E. at 290.

Id. at

19 Id. at 362, 196 N. E. at 291.
20 Id. at 36,4, 196 N. E. at 291.
21 Ibid.
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The decision in this case would also seem to have presaged the
end of the rule that the only consents necessary to revoke were from
those who would be entitled to take if the settlor had died at the time
revocation was requested. The pronouncement in the Corbett case
that such had always been the rule,22 had lost significance and was
23
put to final rest in Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York.
There the settlor directed that the income be paid to him for life and
that payments from principal not to exceed an aggregate of $15,000
be made to him at any time. Upon his death the trust was to terminate and the principal was given to his wife, if she survived him,
if not then to those whom he appointed by will, and in default thereof
to those entitled thereto as if he had died intestate. When revocation
was attempted, the settlor's only next-of-kin had he then died, were
his wife and a brother. They were of full age, and both had consented to the revocation but there were other living blood relatives
of the settlor. The court held that the attempted revocation was ineffectual, that remainder interests had been created in the presumptive next-of-kin of the settlor who, while not now ascertainable, nevertheless had beneficial interests in the trust which could not be defeated without their consent.
The court further stated, "It is true that our opinion in the
Whittemore case assumed that transfers of personal property are embraced by the ancient rule 'that a reservation to the heirs of the
Grantor is equivalent to the reservation of a reversion to the Grantor
himself.' (Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 310.) But this rule
(as the Doctor and Whittemore cases show) is with us no more
than a prima facie precept of construction which may serve to point
the intent of the author, when the interpretation of a writing like
this trust agreement is not otherwise plain. Inasmuch as for us that
rule has now no other effect, it must give place to a sufficient expression by a grantor of his purpose to make a gift of a remainder to
those who will be his distributees ...
"Although it is not an agreed fact that persons now living (other
than James Mack Engel) are blood relatives of the grantor it is
quite impossible to make a different assumption. . . . From any one
of the ancestors of this grantor may stem another family line that
is related to him by consanguinity. This whole group has a contingent remainder created by this trust indenture. 'They take as purchasers through a beneficial right derived from the trust instrument,
and all who have a share in that right and who may, by survival or
other event become members of the class entitled to the remainder
have a beneficial interest in the trust which cannot be destroyed with-

22 Corbett v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242
N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930).
23280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. 2d 673 (1939).
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out their consent.'
358, 363.)"

(Schoellkopj v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y.

24

The court here found a sufficient expression by the settlor of a
purpose to make a gift of the remainder to those who would be his
next-of-kin which it would be beyond his power to defeat except by
testamentary disposition. Stress was placed upon the fact that the
settlor expressly reserved a part ($15,000) of the principal but made
no provision for a return of any of the balance. This it was felt
was much more indicative of an intent to divest himself of the rest
than if no part at all had been retained.2 5 The Engel case seemed
to sound the death knell to hopeful revokers.
It was followed by Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 26 in which
case the settlor was domiciled in Connecticut and limited the gift
over to her next-of-kin under the intestacy laws of New York. It
was held that the ordinary line of succession was varied; this indicated very strongly an intent to make a gift of the remainder to those
persons making up the class designated. It was argued that all those
who would constitute the class, were the settlor to die when revocation was attempted, had consented thereto. The court said, however,
"When a remainder is created in next of kin, consents by those who
would be next of kin at the time of the attempted revocation are
insufficient. (Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267
N. Y. 358;
27
Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, supra.)"
A limitation over to the heirs-at-law or next-of-kin of the settlor
was again found in Minc v. Chase National Bank,28 to be indicative
of intent to vest them with a remainder interest even though the
property was to pass under the laws of the state in which the settloi
was domiciled. The settlor who was also the life beneficiary and
domiciled in New York directed that the trustee convey the corpus
to those entitled thereto "under the Statute of Descent and Distribution of the State of New York" in the absence of any testamentary
disposition of it by her. The court held that the designation of a
particular state's laws to determine the class that would take constituted a gift by purchase and negated an intent that the class take
by descent.
But where a trust was created solely to avoid a will contest and
the principal was to be returned to the settlor if he survived the life
beneficiary, it was held that there was no intent to create a remainder
by a limitation over in certain contingencies to the next-of-kin of
the donor though they were to be determined by the laws of a particular state (New York).29
24

Id. at 47, 19 N. E. 2d at 675.
Id. at 47,'19 N. E. at 674.
28261 App. Div. 465, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1941).
27 Id. at 467, 25 N. Y. S. 2d at 890.
28 263 App. Div. 141, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 592 (lst Dep't 1941).
2
9 Fish v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 251, 59 N. Y. S. 2d
62 (1st Dep't 1945).
25
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The question left open in the Schoellkopf and Engel cases as
to whether the unborn members of the class designated by the instrument who would, upon birth, have a contingent interest in the trust
corpus were persons "beneficially interested" in the trust was answered in Smith v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. 30 In that case the
income from the trust was to be paid to the daughter of the settlor
and upon the death of the settlor she was to receive the principal. If
she predeceased the settlor, her brother was to take, or if he was dead,
his issue if any, would take. If there were no such issue then the
principal was to go to the legal representatives of the settlor. The
brother and sister who had no children, executed written consents.
The court held that there was a reversion, and that the consents of
the possible unborn children of the brother were not necessary to
effect revocation during the life of their father though at birth they
would have had a contingent remainder.
This case re-instilled hope in those who would revoke. It seemed
that the court was leaning towards interpreting trust instruments in
favor of reversions unless precluded by explicit language to the contrary. The ancient rule that a reservation to the heirs of a grantor
is equivalent to the reservation of a reversion to the grantor himself
seemed to take on added force as "a precept of construction." This
view became more discernible in the following three cases:
In Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 31 the income
of the trust was given to the son of the settlor for life and upon his
death the principal to his descendants. If he died without descendants the principal was to be distributed to the next-of-kin of the
settlor at the time of the son's death. No testamentary power of
disposition was reserved and no provision made for the possible contingency of the son predeceasing the settlor. The court applied the
rule of Doctor v. Hughes that a very clear expression of intent must
appear to transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a
reversion. 32 No such clear intention was found and accordingly it
was held that a reversion had been created. The consent of the unmarried son was sufficient even though at the time of the revocation
the settlor had several married brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces.
Furthermore the designated class under the terms of the instrument
could not be ascertained until the son's death without descendants. 33
Although not expressed in the decision, implicit therein is the
"remote contingency" rule soon to be invoked in succeeding decisions.
Had the court found that a remainder was intended the property
might have been distributed to collateral next-of-kin of the settlor

30287 N. Y. 500, 41 N. E. 2d 72 (1942).
31295 N. Y. 488, 68 N. E. 2d 503 (1946).
32225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1909).
33 Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 295 N. Y. 488, 492,
68 N. E. 2d 503, 505 (1946).
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while she was still alive if her son predeceased her without
descendants.
This case was followed by Julier v. Central Hanover Bank &

Trust Co.,34 in which the income of the trust was payable to the

settlor for life, then to his wife during her life. Upon the death of
the wife, or if the settlor survived her, upon his death to the children
of the settlor or their descendants per stirpes; if there were no children or descendants then to the then next-of-kin of the settlor according to the laws of New York (the settlor's domicile) then in
force. The wife and two children (both of age) had consented to
the revocation. Under the terms of the trust instrument the nextof-kin could take only if there -were no children or descendants of
deceased children alive at the time of distribution. The settlor had
provided for the immediate objects of his bounty. The limitation
over to the next-of-kin was a provision for "remote contingencies"
and for persons outside of the direct line of descent. The court
found that a reversion had been created; at most the settlor intended
by his language that the next-of-kin would take only in accordance
with the laws of descent and not by purchase.
The instrument varied the ordinary line of succession and the
class was to be determined by the laws of a particular state. Those
elements had been found sufficient to create remainders in Hopkins
v. Bank of New York 3 5 and Minc v. Chase National Bank.3 6 Revocations were being regarded still more favorably.
The third case which then followed in point of time was
Glanckopf v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 37 in which the income of the trust was payable to the settlor's daughter for life; upon
her death the principal to her appointee by will, in default thereof to
the persons entitled thereto had the life beneficiary died seized of the
property. The indenture further provided however, that the trust
was to terminate and the principal revert to the settlor if his daughter
predeceased him. The daughter, life beneficiary, and presumptive
next-of-kin joined with the settlor in seeking revocation. "Possessing
as she does this general power of appointment by will, the act of the
cestui for life in consenting to the revocation of the trust may be regarded as tantamount to the cutting off of any possible contingent
rights of her future next-of-kin not now ascertainable." 38 Revocation was decreed.
The three foregoing cases not only intensified the trend toward
a liberal interpretation of trust instruments so as to permit revocation
but also injected a new element as a basis therefor. Directly, and
by implication, they advance the concept that it is not normal or
App. Div. 598, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 262 (1st Dep't 1947).
35 See note 26 supra.
36 See note 28 supra.
37274 App. Div. 39, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 54 (1st Dep't 1948).
38 Id. at 42, 80 N. Y. S. 2d at 57.
34272
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natural for a settlor to intend investing possible future next-of-kin
with irrevocable interests beyond his power to defeat, no matter how
far removed, particularly when unborn descendants in the direct line
of descent may be cut off.3 9
The courts had made a natural and realistic approach to the problem and the policy of liberalizing revocations had gone forward to a
marked degree since the Engel case. Then came the latest pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in Richardson v. Richardson40 and the
pendulum seems to have swung back. In that case the settlor provided for the income to her for life; upon her death the trust was to
terminate and the principal be distributed to her appointee by will;
in default of appointment to the settlor's mother if living and if not
to those entitled thereto by the New York laws of intestacy. The
mother died and the settlor requested revocation. Had she then died
intestate, her husband and three children (ages 21, 18 and 15) would
have been entitled to take the property.
The Appellate Division 41 unanimously found that the mother's
remainder became divested on death; that the corpus of the estate on
the death of the settlor would pass by descent to those entitled thereto
under the intestacy laws, in the absence of exercise by the settlor of
the testamentary power of appointment. Furthermore that this
power of appointment, after the mother's death, was merely an expression of the settlor's testamentary capacity to dispose of her own
property and that if the settlor left no will she intended to die intestate as to the property. The cases of Scholtz v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 42 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller 43 and
Fish v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 44 were cited in support of

the finding that a reversion was created.
The Court of Appeals reversed unanimously and found as a legal
conclusion that the settlor intended to and did create a remainder in
favor of her mother, if alive, and if not to her next-of-kin, which she
could not defeat except by an affirmative testamentary act-the exercise of the power of appointment which had been reserved; and that
if a reversion were intended the power of appointment by will would
have been superfluous. In coming to this conclusion the Court of
Appeals also re-examined with approval among others, the cases of
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller,45 Scholtz v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.4 6 and Julier v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
39 See note 37 supra; see Smith v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 287 N. Y.
500, 504, 41 N. E. 2d 72, 74 (1942).
40 120 N. Y. L. J. 411 (Ct. of App. Sept. 13, 1948).
41 Richardson v. Richardson, 272 App. Div. 321, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1st
Dep't 1947).
42 See note 31 supra.
43278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. 2d 553 (1938).
44270 App. Div. 251, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (1st Dep't 1945).
45 See note 43 supra.
46 See note 31 supra.
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Co.,47 upon which the lower court relied. "....

we believe the settlor
evidenced her intention to give a remainder to her next of kin because
she (1) made a full and formal disposition of the principal of the
trust property, (2) made no reservation of a power to grant or assign
an interest in the property during her lifetime, (3) surrendered all
control over the trust property except the power to make testamentary
disposition thereof and the right to appoint a substitute trustee, and
(4) made no provision for the return of any part of the principal to
herself during her lifetime." 48
The Richardson case now gives rise to perplexity as to the
course which the courts may follow hereafter. The policy of liberalizing revocations and the realistic approach seem to have been abandoned. Certainly the atmosphere is shrouded in doubt and heavy
and dark clouds once more hang over Doctor v. Hughes. Clarification is indicated, if not imperative. There-is no comfort to be found
in the recently enacted Article 79 of the Civil Practice Act which
merely defines procedural methods to be followed in trust accountings.4 9 The remedy would lie in retroactive statutory enactments
and should receive the closest consideration of the New York State
Law Revision Commission.
DANIEL M.

SHIENTAG.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS WHERE STATUTE REQUIRES AGENT'S
AUTHORITY TO BE IN WRITING

A majority of jurisdictions in the United States have Statutes
of Frauds which require an agent's authority to be in writing under
certain circumstances.- There is considerable variation as to the situations which require written authority on the part of the agent; some
statutes require such authority in all situations wherein the Statute
of Frauds applies, 2 while others make no provision that the agent's
4 See note 34 supra.
48 120 N. Y. L. J. 411 (Ct. of App. Sept. 13, 1948).
49N. Y. Cn,. PRAc. AcT §§ 1307-1319. But see Ninth Annual Report of
the Judicial Council, 1943 LEG. Doc. No. 20, pp. 311-312.
%Typical of these statutes are CAL. Civ. CODE §2309 (1937); DEL. REV.
CODE § 3106 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT., c. 59, § 2 (1943); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 106 (1935); N. J. REv. STAT. §§ 25:1-1, 25:1-2 (1937); PA. STAT. ANN.,

tit. 33, § 1 (1936); TEx. STAT. REv. Civ., art. 1288 (1936); VT. PuB. LAWS
§ 1675 (1933).
2A typical statute is CAL. Civ. CoDE § 2309 (1937): "An authorization
is sufficient for any purpose, except that an authority to enter into a contract
required to be in writing can only be given by an instrument in writing."

